11.05.2026, 11:23   #1

Aid for Ukraine

Continuation of the discussion regarding the photo deleted by Manfred Hopp

As expected, Manfred Hopp deleted his photo. That's why I saved the page in time:



Manfred Hopp
We need to focus on repairing the bridges in Ukraine first. In return, they blow up our gas pipelines. It’s truly a tragedy what these well-paid, unskilled helpers in Berlin are doing. What awaits us in the future can be seen in Mr. Philipp Amthor. It definitely won’t get any better.
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Voice of Reason
That’s a very short-sighted view.

Of course, our bridges need funding. No one disputes that. But politics doesn’t work like a household budget where you simply say: “Either bridges here or aid there.” The real question any logical person should ask is different: What are the long-term costs of each action?

If we help Ukraine, it’s not about handing out money somewhere out of kindness. It’s about stopping Russia where it is currently waging war against Europe. Every kilometer Putin’s army doesn’t advance there is one less kilometer of threat to Europe. This isn’t a romantic gesture of solidarity; it’s cold self-interest and pure logic.

Short-term thinking means: We fix our bridges today and cut aid to Ukraine, only to pay later with enormous war costs against Russia.

Long-term thinking means: We help Ukraine stop Russia now so we don’t have to spend much more money, resources, and in the worst case, even our own soldiers later. Because if Russia succeeds by force, it won’t become more peaceful—it will be encouraged to continue its plans. Then we won’t just pay with concrete and steel but possibly with lives, equipment, and a far more insecure future for Europe.

The comment about the gas pipelines is also flawed. It first assumes guilt as if it were conclusively proven and politically clear-cut. That is definitely not the case. Secondly, it turns it into a kind of quid pro quo: “We help you, so you must never harm us.” That’s not how security policy works. We don’t judge based on offense but on consequences. The key question remains: Does our aid weaken an aggressor threatening Europe, or does our energy trade with Russia strengthen that aggressor?

And here it becomes quite clear: Anyone demanding to stop support must honestly say what the alternative would be. Would you prefer that we continue to fund Putin’s war machine so it can keep advancing into Europe, killing people, destroying cities, and subjugating countries?

That’s the point: It’s not about whether bridges are important to us. Of course, they are. It’s about understanding that broken bridges are costly, but a larger war in Europe would be far more expensive. Those who only look at today’s bill miss tomorrow’s.

And that’s exactly why this kind of short-sighted populism is so dangerous. It sounds simple, comfortable, and relatable at first, but in reality, it’s not a smart analysis—it’s a shortcut in thinking. Populists exploit this: They offer seemingly simple answers to complex questions because they know many people either can’t or won’t think deeper. Those who argue like this don’t defend our bridges; they become tools for those who profit from political shortsightedness.

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Manfred Hopp Intellectual nonsense!
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Voice of Reason
“Intellectual nonsense” is not a rebuttal but a mental surrender with sound effects.

You didn’t respond to a single argument. Not the long-term costs. Not the security policy question. Not the alternative you indirectly demand. Not what happens if Russia succeeds by force. Instead, you resort to a personal attack at the lowest level. That’s the classic escape when you have no substance left: You insult the statement because you can’t refute it.

This is exactly how you tell the difference between an opinion and a barstool reflex. An opinion can be justified. A reflex only needs a buzzword.

And yes, reactions like this are the fertile ground where right-wing populism grows. Not because someone asks critical questions—critical questions are perfectly fine. But because complex issues are crushed into a simple angry slogan. “Our bridges!” sounds tangible. “Ukraine costs us money!” sounds convenient. “Gas pipelines!” sounds outraged. But none of that forms a sound argument.

Populists thrive on giving ordinary people simple explanations for difficult problems. They provide a ready-made enemy image, a bit of wounded pride, and the comforting feeling of having figured something out, even though in reality you’ve just accepted what fits your frustrated worldview. Anything that disturbs this picture is not examined but brushed aside. That’s exactly what you’ve just demonstrated impressively.

If my argument is wrong, then refute it. Show why it would be cheaper and safer in the long run to let Russia do as it pleases. Show why an aggressor who succeeds by war would suddenly be less dangerous to Europe. Show why we should cut aid to Ukraine today if it might cost us much more money, resources, and in the worst case, lives tomorrow.

But “intellectual nonsense” only shows one thing: You have no answer. You just used an insult as a substitute for logical thinking. That might get a quick cheer at the pub, but in a serious discussion, it’s a declaration of bankruptcy. 😉

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Ulf Simon
@ Voice of Reason: First of all, your arguments are logically plausible. But you make the same mistake you accuse others of: you think too short-term. Ukraine, Russia, and the consequences: warfare no longer works like it used to; wars have become asymmetric. The best example is Ukraine, which can hold out so long against the overwhelming Russia thanks to high-tech. You no longer need hundreds of thousands of soldiers as cannon fodder. Instead, you need highly trained specialists coordinating fully “robotic” war machines, truly capable intelligence services (like Mossad, for example), disrupting enemy communication and control networks, and so on. Of course, these specialists cost significantly more in salary and are much harder to replace—not like the cynical Churchill quote, “Man is the only commodity that can be reproduced in large quantities by unskilled labor in the medium term.” But infrastructure becomes much cheaper—fewer barracks because operations are decentralized anyway, and lower material costs. A drone costing a few thousand euros can destroy a million-euro tank; expensive fighter jets and ships become largely obsolete. Regarding Putin: He is the only psychopath with too much power. Defense must work in all directions. Germany alone is too insignificant to handle this but not insignificant enough to avoid attracting attention and to completely forgo military. (Like Costa Rica, which for me is a potential place to emigrate.) The only sensible solution would be a significant strengthening of Europe—something like the “United States of Europe” with joint defense, economic, financial, and environmental policies. Current national governments of large states should be divided into regions roughly the size of our federal states, with corresponding regional competencies, comparable to federal states or Swiss cantons. Here in southern Baden, I see more cultural similarities with Alsace or the northwestern Swiss cantons than with Berlin and Prussia. And last but not least: I’ve already commented on dependence on fossil energy (including uranium).
11.05.2026, 11:25   #2
@Ulf Simon

You raise some very valid points in several places, but precisely because of that, your objection to my argument isn’t really an objection. You hardly contradict me on the substance; rather, you just shift the focus and assume that I haven’t taken modern warfare into account. But that’s not the case.

Of course, war today doesn’t work the way it did back then. Drones, satellite reconnaissance, electronic warfare, cyberattacks, disruption of communication networks, intelligence operations, decentralized units, and precision weapons have massively transformed warfare. But this doesn’t disprove my argument—it actually reinforces it.

Because precisely due to modern wars becoming more asymmetric, technical, and networked, it’s even more crucial to stop an aggressive state early on, rather than letting it learn, test, rearm, and perfect its methods. Russia isn’t just waging a traditional land war with artillery and tanks in Ukraine; it’s also gaining practical experience with drones, electronic warfare, cyber operations, disinformation, energy blackmail, and industrial war production. Anyone who concludes from this that the threat becomes cheaper and less serious isn’t thinking ahead—they’re missing the point.

The argument that “a cheap drone can destroy an expensive tank” is true, but it doesn’t lead to the conclusion that defense overall becomes cheap. A drone might cost just a few thousand euros. But the system behind it costs far more: reconnaissance, data processing, satellites, radio networks, electronic countermeasures, training, software, logistics, ammunition resupply, production capacity, protection against enemy jamming, and the ability to keep it all running under fire. The cheap flying device is just the visible tip of a very expensive technical and organizational iceberg.

And here lies the next point: modern technology doesn’t make war cheaper; it just shifts the costs. If a tank can be replaced by a cheap drone, a state doesn’t suddenly spend less on war. Instead of building one drone instead of a tank, it builds hundreds of thousands or millions of drones, plus control systems, reconnaissance, jamming technology, defense systems, software, production, and supply chains. War has never been as expensive as a single weapon system costs. War is always as costly as the attacker is willing and able to invest. Technology only changes where the money flows—not the logic or the scale of armament.

It’s also true that today you don’t need hundreds of thousands of soldiers as cannon fodder. But that doesn’t mean soldiers suddenly become irrelevant. Ukraine is showing the exact opposite: modern technology is crucial, but it doesn’t fully replace people, terrain, supply, endurance, and mass. Drones don’t capture cities on their own. Electronic warfare doesn’t hold a frontline alone. Specialists are more valuable, but precisely for that reason, they’re harder to replace. This doesn’t make war less dangerous; on the contrary, it makes it riskier.

The real flaw in reasoning is this: you correctly describe that wars have become more modern, but you treat it as if this changes the fundamental strategic question. The fundamental question remains: Is it better for Europe if Russia is stopped in Ukraine, or if Russia succeeds there and concludes that military force works?

My answer remains: It’s ultimately cheaper, safer, and politically wiser for us to support Ukraine now than to face a stronger, more experienced, and emboldened aggressor later. Whether that aggressor uses tanks, drones, cyberattacks, energy blackmail, or disinformation doesn’t change the core. It actually makes the core issue even more serious.

Your point about Putin also falls short. Yes, Putin isn’t the only danger in the world. Defense obviously has to work in multiple directions. But that doesn’t mean we should downplay the immediate threat on our doorstep. If one side of your house is on fire, you don’t say, “We need to think about fire safety in all directions,” and let that side keep burning. You put out the fire that’s actually there and then improve overall fire safety.

Your idea of a stronger European structure—joint defense, economic, financial, and environmental policies—is basically the long-term vision I’m talking about. A more united Europe would be strategically stronger than a patchwork of national self-interests. Germany alone is too small to play global power politics but too large and wealthy to stay out of power issues. That’s why Europe needs the ability to act. But that doesn’t contradict support for Ukraine. On the contrary: supporting Ukraine is a practical test of whether Europe is even willing to take its own security seriously.

The reference to Costa Rica sounds appealing but isn’t comparable to Europe. Costa Rica can afford its unique path partly because it’s in a completely different geopolitical environment and indirectly benefits from security structures provided by others. In the middle of Europe, next to an aggressive Russia, this model can’t simply be transferred. That wouldn’t be peace policy; it would be outsourcing your own security to others—and we’ve already seen how that goes.

Your regional idea—southern Baden, Alsace, northwest Switzerland, closer in mentality than to Berlin or Prussia—is culturally understandable. But mentality doesn’t replace defense capability. A Russian power apparatus doesn’t care whether southern Baden feels culturally closer to Basel or Berlin. Security policy isn’t based on perceived regional affinity but on power, alliances, infrastructure, deterrence, and the ability to act.

On the topic of fossil fuels and uranium: here, too, we’re not far apart. Dependence on fossil fuels has been and remains a massive strategic problem. Whoever depends on authoritarian states eventually pays not just in money but in political blackmail. But this actually strengthens my argument: Russia was long financed through European energy dependence. Anyone who wants to learn from this must reduce dependencies while simultaneously preventing such a state from expanding its power militarily.

In summary, I see no real contradiction with my position. You say wars have become more modern, asymmetric, and technical. Correct. You say Europe must become stronger, more united, and more independent. Correct. You say defense can’t be thought of only nationally. Also correct.

But that doesn’t mean my argument was “too narrow.” It means it’s even stronger on a second level. Because if modern threats are more complex, faster, and harder to control, then it’s all the more short-sighted to let an aggressive state in Europe run free and hope it will cost us less later.

The real error isn’t overlooking modern warfare. The error is portraying modern warfare as if it overturns the old strategic truth: Stopping an aggressor early is always cheaper than having to stop them later when they’re bigger, more experienced, and more confident.
11.05.2026, 11:42   #3

Hobbyfotograf

Ah, I’m totally in the loop again.
11.05.2026, 11:46   #4
@Malte Donez:
I'm not sure what exactly you’re trying to contribute with this brief comment on the topic.
11.05.2026, 12:40   #5

Hobbyfotograf

@Voice of Reason: Costs: Your argument is fundamentally sound, but our government just hasn’t caught on yet. They’re only subsidizing companies like Rheinmetall at the taxpayers’ expense, while outdated military equipment is being “disposed of” hastily. I don’t see any real progress in defense policy.
Russia, and possibly others: Maybe it’s time to revisit Persia in the 11th century. Hassan i Sabbah’s method was highly effective, very cost-efficient, and technologically adaptable—something Israel’s military approach before Benji’s meltdown clearly demonstrated.
Ukraine: Of course, it should be supported, but not at the expense of our own infrastructure. Even in this support, our government seems primarily focused on boosting the growth of our arms industry. There are definitely more efficient ways to handle this.
11.05.2026, 15:54   #6
The phrase "Supporting Ukraine, but not at the expense of our own infrastructure" perfectly illustrates the flawed thinking that’s been at the heart of this discussion: You’re treating aid to Ukraine like some external charity competing with our own interests. It’s not.

Here’s a simple example:
If your roof is leaking and someone is trying to break down your front door at the same time, you wouldn’t say, “I’d fix the door, but not at the expense of the roof.” Of course, the roof needs repairing. But if you don’t stop the intruder, you won’t have to worry about the roof for much longer. Security isn’t a luxury that comes after infrastructure—it’s the foundation that allows infrastructure to be protected, used, and planned for the long term. That’s exactly why framing it as “Bridges or Ukraine” is a false choice.

The real question isn’t: Are we spending money on Ukraine or on ourselves? The question is: Are we investing now to keep a bigger threat away from Europe, or will we pay much more later when that threat is closer, stronger, and more experienced?

It’s fair to criticize our government for handling many things clumsily, driven by industry interests, or inefficiently—I’m right there with you. But poor execution doesn’t negate the strategic necessity. If a fire truck is poorly organized when it sets out, that doesn’t mean we should just let the fire burn.

References to old or modern asymmetric tactics don’t change this either. Individual “cost-effective” measures can have an impact, but they don’t replace a country’s overall defense or a European security framework. Intelligence services, special operations, drones, cyber defense, traditional deterrence, industrial production capacity, and stable infrastructure all belong together. Picking out just one piece and calling it the solution oversimplifies the problem.

In short: Yes, we need to renovate our infrastructure. Yes, we need to control and use defense spending more efficiently. Yes, Europe needs a better security architecture. But none of that means aid to Ukraine is opposed to our own interests. It’s part of them. Anyone who separates the two is thinking too narrowly and looking at a single bill instead of the total cost of an insecure Europe.
11.05.2026, 16:17   #7

Hobbyfotograf

@Voice of Reason: We fundamentally have different views on the analysis of the problem. Putin is not Russia, and he’s not immortal. And what’s in it for us? First, you’d have to clearly define who “we” are. Your method of fearmongering benefits certain groups in Germany and, to some extent, in Europe more than a thoughtful, analytical approach would. There are also many issues in this country that have been botched by the economy itself and are now being propped up by the government under the pretense of preserving a few jobs. There’s plenty of room to cut costs there, so special debts—sorry, special funds—aren’t necessary. There must be no “too big to fail.” The firefighting analogy is seriously off the mark.
11.05.2026, 16:46   #8
Now that I’ve laid out all the points logically and analytically, you’ve switched your discussion tactics instead of addressing my arguments.

You say the firefighter analogy is “way off” — but you can’t explain exactly where the flaw in the reasoning lies. That’s not a rebuttal, just a label. A comparison doesn’t have to match every detail perfectly. It needs to highlight the crucial connection. And that connection is clear here: when there’s an immediate danger, you can debate costs, organization, and efficiency — but you can’t pretend that putting out the fire itself is the mistake.

You accuse me of “fearmongering.” Again, that’s not an argument, it’s a dismissal. Analyzing and naming a threat isn’t panic. Panic is reacting without thinking. This is precisely the opposite: a sober question of whether it’s cheaper and safer for Europe to stop an aggressor early, or to face a bigger problem later. If you call that “fearmongering instead of analytical thinking,” you’re just projecting your own behavior.

And your “Who is ‘we’?” is also not a deeper analysis but a dodge when things get specific. Of course, you can philosophically dissect “we.” But in this context, it’s perfectly clear what’s meant: the people in Germany and Europe who depend on security, infrastructure, energy supply, stable borders, and political capability. Obscuring that doesn’t move the conversation forward one bit.

That’s exactly the point:
You accuse me of not thinking analytically, yet you rely on the typical shortcuts of populist argumentation: “fearmongering,” “certain circles benefit,” “who is ‘we’?”, “the comparison is off.” It sounds critical, but these are just superficial catchphrases without substance. They don’t replace a counter-calculation, a strategic alternative, or an answer to the core question. The core question remains: What is ultimately cheaper and safer for Europe — supporting Ukraine now, or allowing Russia to succeed militarily and politically? Until there’s a clear answer to that, we’re not debating different analyses; you’re just avoiding the real question.
11.05.2026, 17:09   #9

Hobbyfotograf

@Voice of Reason: On the first point, a clarification: I see the danger, but not as immediate as you do. I believe there’s still some time to act without rushing into panic-driven measures. The opportunity to "stop the aggressor early" was missed, not least due to underestimating them. I’m not against sensible measures, even costly ones, but only AFTER a more detailed analysis, including how to finance them. Acting hastily based on insufficient planning borders on fear-mongering in my view, and that won’t build a democratic majority—it only deepens polarization. I’m simply calling for more prudence.
"What it’s about: the people in Germany and Europe who depend on security, infrastructure, energy supply, stable borders, and political capability." These are many different aspects: security is an abstract concept—no state on this planet can guarantee absolute security. Infrastructure benefits everyone, but energy supply is much more nuanced: sensible energy-saving measures are delayed because certain groups profit from the status quo, and technically feasible solutions are obstructed for the same reasons. Significantly reducing fossil fuels weakens Russia (and other troublemakers as well). Stable borders can’t be defined militarily, or at best only temporarily, as the example of Ukraine clearly shows, but also attempts by democracies like Israel to illegally expand their territory under international law. Donald’s Greenland, Cuba, and Panama fantasies also point in this direction. And political capability? That’s defined very differently even within countries... Overall, there’s no unified set of interests, which is why I ask, “Who exactly is ‘we’?”
I’m not accusing you of lacking analytical thinking—that’s clear from this discussion. We’re not that far apart; I just don’t see a definitive priority list set in stone. I feel some aspects are still missing.
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